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Abstract
The goal of this paper is twofold: First, to develop an estimable model of legisla-
tive politics in the US Congress. Second, to provide a greater understanding of the
objectives behind the New Deal. In the theoretical model, the distribution of federal
funds across regions of the country is the outcome of a bargaining game in which the
President acts as the agenda-setter and Congress bargains over the ﬁnal shape of the
spending bill. For any given preferences (of the President) and distribution of seats in
Congress, the model delivers a unique predicted allocation. Combined with data on
New Deal programs, this is used to estimate the objectives of the Roosevelt adminis-
tration. The results indicate that economic concerns for relief and recovery, though not
necessarily for fundamental reform and development, largely drove New Deal spending.
Political concerns also mattered, but more on the margin.
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11 Introduction
The motivation behind the actions of politicians, a topic of intrinsic interest for political
scientists, has received signiﬁcant recent attention by quantitative political economists. For
instance, key questions in the political agency literature center around the issue of whether,
and if so how, the political process selects political decision-makers with the right intentions
(and skills).1 More broadly, the entire formal political economy literature is in some sense
built on the idea that governments cannot be treated as simple welfare-maximizers. Instead,
in order to understand economic and public policy outcomes, the motivation and intentions
of political decision-makers have to be carefully analyzed.
In the US, discussions about “what motivates government” naturally center around the
period and programs described as the New Deal. This period was, by most accounts, the
birth of the US welfare state. It was an era of unprecedented growth in total government
spending, as well as in the scope of activities performed by the federal government. In the
mid 1920’s, just before the Great Depression and the New Deal, total federal (non-military)
spending was approximately equal to 3 percent of GNP, while in the mid 1930’s this ﬁgure
had increased to about 10 percent. The support for state and local government expenditures
from the federal level also increased dramatically. Earlier in the 20th Century, less than
one percent of state and local revenues came from the federal government, while in the late
1930’s about 15 percent of state and local revenues were due to federal aid. In addition,
it created many of the government programs and structures, such as Social Security and
various agricultural programs, that form the basis of the public sector in the US still to this
day.2
The New Deal was controversial already from the beginning and has stayed controversial
ever since. The attacks have come from the left as well as from the right, on a number of
diﬀerent topics and from a number of diﬀerent angles. Among many other critical accounts,
the New Deal has been criticized by Zinn (1966) and Bernstein (1968) for being too conserva-
tive, by Powell (2003) and Cole and Ohanian (2004) for prolonging the Great Depression, by
Libecap (1998) for instigating a lasting system of state intervention in agricultural markets,
and by Flynn (1934) for being essentially a fascist undertaking.
Of particular relevance here is the oﬃcial line of “the three R’s” (relief, recovery and
reform) emphasized by the New Dealers as the motivation behind this increase in federal
spending and federal aid to the local level. However, Roosevelt’s critics accused him of using
national funds in order to reward Democratic states as well as to gain popularity in potential
1See, for instance, the work of Besley (2004, 2006) or Callander (2005).
2These values are taken from Wallis (1985) and Wallis (1998).
2swing states. Economic historians and public choice scholars have long been interested in
this debate about the motivation behind the New Deal, and the determinants of the New
Deal spending allocation. As stated by John Wallis, the question of focus in this literature
has been:
Did Roosevelt and the New Dealers allocate money between states to achieve their
stated goals of relief and reform by giving money to states with lower employment
and lower incomes, or did they promote their own interests and allocate more
money to states that were politically sensitive? [Wallis, 1998]
The empirical literature on this topic started with Reading (1973), who developed a
simple model in order to test whether the New Deal spending pattern was in fact consistent
with a focus on reform and relief/recovery. The second now-classic empirical study of the
motivations behind the New Deal spending, Wright (1974), built on the analysis of Reading to
investigate a potentially political motive behind the New Deal. These two studies generated
a signiﬁcant amount of following research. Recently, Anderson and Tollison (1991) included
a number of variables intended to capture the role of Congress in the determination of the
New Deal allocation.
These studies suggest that the regional distribution of the major New Deal programs
might have been politically rather than economically motivated. However, in a series of
papers, John Wallis (1984, 1985, 1998) derives results that depart somewhat (though not
completely) from this view. Wallis takes the position that political concerns did matter,
but that the distribution of New Deal funds was primarily motivated by economic concerns.
However, Wallis also shows that the economic reasons behind the programs interacted with
political motives, making the diﬀerent possible objectives hard to disentangle.3
To summarize, previous studies provide support for the idea that political purposes prob-
ably inﬂuenced the spending pattern of the New Deal. There is, however, no consensus on
the question of how important the political calculations were, in relation to other possible
objectives. A serious challenge is the interaction between economic and political concerns.
Possibly, a formal treatment of this topic can provide additional structure helpful for the
interpretation of the diﬀering and sometimes non-comparable previous research.4
3This view is reinforced by the recent joint work of Price Fishback, Shawn Kantor and Wallis (2003).
4There are a few papers, such as Fleck (1999, 2001) and Strömberg (2004), that do develop formal models
in order to interpret various aspects of the New Deal spending. These papers, however, diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from ours in their methodological approach and/or their posed question. Fleck assumes that the President
was trying to maximize his reelection probability. His ﬁndings broadly support they idea that political
(reelection) concerns did matter, though he is not able to assess the relative importance of this and other
motives. Strömberg, on the other hand, does estimate the structural parameters of his model. The model,
however, is conﬁned to an analysis of the impact of media on the spending of one particular program (FERA)
- i.e. he does not attempt to say anything about the aggregate distribution of New Deal funds.
3Speciﬁcally, in this paper we develop a formal model of legislative politics in the US,
applicable to the interaction between the President and the Congress during the implemen-
tation of new spending programs. The resulting allocation of funds is modeled as a function
of the President’s preferences and the distribution of seats in Congress, and the relevant pa-
rameters of the model are estimated using data from New Deal programs. The model takes
into account the key features of the President-Congress bargaining game. However, it does
not capture the full richness of the previous work on the New Deal, as the computational
limitations implied by the formal modeling approach make this impossible. Hence, this paper
should appropriately be viewed as a complement, not a substitute, to the existing research
on the determinants of the allocation of New Deal funds.
In addition to the contribution it hopefully makes to the New Deal debate, this paper
can be viewed as an attempt to place formal models of legislative politics in a more concrete
setting. The bulk of theoretical (formal) political economy research on legislative politics is
quite abstract and lacks institutional detail. Clearly, this previous research has generated
very valuable general insights, e.g. on the role of constitutions and agenda-setting power for
legislative outcomes, However, it provides limited guidance for understanding the outcome of
particular legislative sessions or speciﬁc periods of major reform. Instead of a general theory
of legislative bargaining, this paper provides a model of a speciﬁc legislative setting.5 That
is, we adopt an alternative “case-based” or “bottom-up” approach to the formal modeling
of legislatures. Hopefully, this approach can generate insights that would not trivially follow
from more abstract models.
In the rest of the paper, we ﬁrst describe extensively the formal political model, then
derive a number of theoretical results characterizing legislative decision-making in the US
Congress, and the outcome of the interaction between the President and Congress. All of
this is done in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss our regional classiﬁcation of the US in the
1930s. In Section 4, we describe the data, and in Section 5 we provide an overview of the
empirical approach as well as the estimation results. Finally, Section 6 contains a conclusion
as well as a discussion of potentially interesting extensions.
5In this regard, our paper is perhaps most closely related to the work of Knight (2004, 2005), who
estimates key parameters of the formal legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) in applied
settings.
42 The Political Model
2.1 Overview
2.1.1 What’s a good model of legislatures?
It is far from obvious how a good model of legislative politics, applied to this particular
context, should look like. At least three existing frameworks come to mind as related and
potentially able to speak on the questions posed here. The ﬁrst of these is the legisla-
tive bargaining literature, starting with the seminal contribution of Baron and Ferejohn
(1989), which extends the theory of bargaining developed by Rubinstein (1982) to a polit-
ical/legislative setting.6 The second is the agenda-setter model developed by Romer and
Rosenthal (1978, 1979). In these models, an exogenously determined agenda-setter, on a
one-dimensional issue, faces the constraint of a majority vote and can therefore only imple-
ment those policies that the median voter prefers to the status quo. The third is the pivotal
politics model developed by Krehbiel (1998), a theoretical framework based on the idea that,
for any particular issue, a pivotal voter (legislator) can be identiﬁed, and the ﬁnal policy
outcome hinges critically upon her preferences.
All of these approaches provide insights of signiﬁcant value for understanding legislative
politics, in the US and elsewhere. However, neither of these frameworks contain the level of
institutional detail necessary to quantitatively interpret speciﬁc legislative settings, such as
the dramatic period in 1933 after the landslide victory of FDR and the Democrats. Hence,
we develop a new formal model of US Congress. In addition to the New Deal application,
the model could be viewed as a starting point towards a formal theory of legislative politics
and major reforms in the US, one that is institutionally richer than the existing models.7
What are then the most important institutional features of US legislative politics? Our
highly subjective view is that the following features, ranked in order of deemed importance,
are suﬃcient to give a good characterization of the formal institutional environment: (i)
There are two chambers with diﬀerent distribution of seats across states, and law-making
follows a sequential procedure, with the House of Representatives moving before the Sen-
ate on spending bills, (ii) The President is elected nationally while Congress members are
6The original model by Baron and Ferejohn focuses on distributive politics with exogenous status quo,
but the framework has been extended to spatial bargaining by Banks and Duggan (2000, 2006) and Cho
and Duggan (2006), as well as to bargaining with endogenous status quo by, among others, Baron (1996)
and Kalandrakis (2004). In addition, Merlo and Wilson (1995) introduced stochastic elements in the basic
model of distributive politics.
7Krehbiel’s (1998) framework contains more intitutional detail than the other models. However, it is
diﬀerent in purpose and lacks several of the features that we consider critical for the application in this
paper. Still, we do think of the pivotal politics model as the work most closely related to the model
developed here.
5elected by local constituencies (iii) Disagreements between the two chambers are resolved in
a conference committee, (iv) The President has legislative veto power, (v) Committee and
subcommittee chairs, as well as Congress members with formal “leadership positions” (such
as the majority leader and the speaker of the House), can be quite inﬂuential and often have
the power to stop legislation from happening, and (vi) There is a ﬁlibuster option in the
Senate. To this, an informal institutional feature should be added: the fact that the Presi-
dent often, when it comes to major reform, functions as the de facto agenda-setter, despite
not having such a role assigned constitutionally.8
While all being relevant, trying to include all of these institutional features in an es-
timable model proves to be very diﬃcult. We model explicitly the ﬁrst three of the listed
features. In addition, we model the President as the agenda-setter. Including the fourth
feature in the model would have no eﬀect on the outcome. The two latter features are not
formally modeled, as we believe them to be less important for understanding the nature of
the spending allocation across broad regions. However, in particular the role of committees
(v) is clearly an important feature in other settings.9 Furthermore, the role of inﬂuential in-
dividual legislators (leaders) could help with the interpretation of the allocation of spending
at a more detailed regional level than is the focus of this paper.10
2.1.2 Assumptions on Preferences
When it comes to the preferences of the President and the Congress members, we make a
number of simplifying restrictions. Perhaps most importantly, we assume that the decision
to implement a program and the decision about the allocation of spending can be analyzed
separately, and we do not explicitly analyze preferences over the generation of revenue.
That is, we focus exclusively on the spending side of the New Deal, and therefore implicitly
assume that any preferences that the President and the legislators might have had over the
tax collection (and over budget deﬁcit levels) did not interact with their preferences for the
shape of the spending. This is a signiﬁcant simpliﬁcation, but one that is, at the very least,
in line with the economic history literature on the topic.
Regarding the Congress members, we model them as “perfect representatives” of their
8Why the President often functions as the de facto agenda-setter, and when this is the case, are very
important questions in their own right. Furthermore, these questions are not satisfactoraly answered by
existing research, hence they provide interesting possibilities for future work.
9Committees have been analyzed extensively elsewhere. Among the most inﬂuential studies are Shepsle
and Weingast (1987a, 1987b), Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), Weingast and Marshall (1988) and Epstein and
O’Halloran (1999). These studies, however, are typically focused on explaining the existence of committees,
rather than predicting their eﬀects.
10For instance, Wallis (1998) ascribes the large share of New Deal funds that went to Nevada to the
inﬂuence of Key Pittman, President Pro Tempore of the Senate 1933-1940.
6constituencies, with preferences deﬁned (only) over the allocation received by their states.
Given the assumption that the size and shape of the spending can be analyzed separately,
this still allows for the Congress members having (ideological) preferences regarding the size
of public spending. It does mean, however, that once the size of the spending is determined,
the legislators bargain only with the welfare of their own region in mind. Note that this is in
line with the assumptions typically used in the legislative bargaining literature on distributive
politics initiated by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Furthermore, we view it to be in the spirit
of Mayhew’s (1974) now-classic conclusion that members of Congress are primarily driven
by reelection concerns, and therefore seek a tight link to their own constituencies. Still, this
is a restrictive assumption, and one that would be interesting to extend.
Since the parameters of the President’s utility function are at the core of what is to be
determined in our empirical analysis, the details of this utility function will be discussed
more extensively both in the theoretical and empirical sections. For now, simply note that
we allow for the welfare of all regions (citizens) to enter the President’s utility function. This
diﬀerence between the utility functions of the legislators and the President is meant to reﬂect
the feature that the nationally elected President and the locally elected Congress members
represent very diﬀerent constituencies.
Given these assumptions about preferences and agenda-setting, our paper may be thought
of as a model of an executive branch (or some other exogenously determined external player)
with de facto agenda-setting power trying to implement a program. The executive faces an
explicitly modeled “congressional constraint” generated by the need to reconcile the interests
of legislators (with amending power) that represent diﬀerent (and disjoint) constituencies.
We do not claim that this representation captures everything that mattered during the
implementation of the New Deal. However, we do believe that our setup captures many of
the most important aspects that follow from the structure of Congress and the conﬂict of
interest between the President and the legislators.
2.1.3 Dividing the US into Regions
Our model divides the country in three regions. This modeling choice is motivated by
our view that in the 1930s this classiﬁcation achieves a good balance between realism and
tractability. States within each of the regions were quite homogeneous, especially at the
political level, which makes it possible to associate regions of the country with voting blocs
in the Congress. This will be discussed in greater detail later. For now, we simply want the
reader to note that the model’s division of the country into three regions is a result that
follows from the characteristics of the US in the 1930s, and not an ad-hoc division imposed
in order to simplify the theoretical analysis.
72.2 Formal Setup
We model the allocation decisions within each type of program as a separate bargaining
game. In this game, the President acts as an agenda setter and Congress determines the
ﬁnal division of a ﬁxed amount of resources. The set of congressional players is given by three
groups of states (regions): I = {West, North, South}. An outcome of the bargaining game
is simply a division of a given amount of resources among the three regions x = (xW,xN,xS).
The total amount of resources is normalized so that
 
i xi = 1. Each group i ∈ I holds a
fraction qi of the total seats in the House and a fraction pi of the seats in the Senate. We
assume that no group has an absolute majority of seats in either chamber. In line with the
description of congressmen’s preferences, the utility function of region i is given by:
ui (x) = xi ∀i ∈ I
Unlike congressional players, we allow the President to hold arbitrary preferences over
allocation of resources. We assume these preferences can be represented by a utility function
f (x,t) : ∆
2 × R
3 → R
where the vector t = (ti)i∈I represents the president’s relative inclination to assigning re-
sources to each of the regions. The only restriction we impose on f (x,t) is continuity in x,
for all t.
The timing of the game reﬂects the description of the most important steps in the leg-
islative process. First, the President proposes a split of the total resources going into a
particular program, where the split is denoted by x ∈ ∆2. The House then evaluates the
proposal as follows: with an initial yes/no vote it determines whether to pass the bill on
unchanged. This eﬀectively requires two groups voting in favor of the President’s proposal.
If the proposal passes unchanged, the Senate takes on the proposal. Otherwise, a House
member is randomly selected to renegotiate the allocation, by proposing an amendment
x′ ∈ ∆2. Each member has the same probability of being recognized. Hence, groups are
recognized to make a proposal with probabilities proportional to their shares of seats qi in
the House. An amendment proposal is eﬀectively a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer that one group
of states makes to the rest of the chamber. The House votes on the proposed amendment,
a positive vote resulting in the bill being passed on to the Senate, a negative vote implying
the bill is scratched. The Senate follows a similar procedure, where the text approved by
the House represents the initial proposal. The bargaining process in the Senate may yield a
diﬀerent outcome from that of the House because groups are represented in diﬀerent propor-
8tions. If the Senate approves the initial proposal, then the outcome is directly implemented.
However, if the Senate modiﬁes the initial proposal, we model the outcome of bargaining in
the Conference Committee as a convex combination of the House and Senate bills.
In more precise terms, the president’s strategy set consists of all possible proposals. A
strategy for a congressional player is a more complicated object. It consists of the following:
(i) a mapping from proposals into a binary vote, (ii) a history independent amendment
proposal and (iii) a function from amendments into binary votes. Note that congressmen
are assumed to always vote for their preferred option, regardless of whether they could be
pivotal.
2.3 Theoretical Results
Proceeding by backward induction, we ﬁrst analyze the Senate bargaining subgame following
the rejection of the House bill. At this stage, a senator is randomly selected an amender.
When a bill (x) coming from the House is introduced in the Senate, each congressional
player (i) compares her payoﬀ from voting in favor of the bill (xi) to the expected gains
from rejecting it. The extent of these gains is equal to the probability of a senator from her
own group i being selected as a proposer in the subsequent amending stage. We prove this
formally in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Each group i has a reservation utility in the Senate equal to its share of
seats (pi).
Proof. Denote the bill that comes into the Senate by x. If the Senate modiﬁes the bill to
x′, the outcome will be x+x′
2 , while it will be equal to x+x
2 if it doesn’t. Therefore, at the
amending stage, senators only care about the outcome of the Senate bargaining process.
Since the Senator recognized to amend can make a take-it-or-leave it oﬀer to the rest of
the chamber, she can propose an allocation in which her group keeps the entire amount
of resources. In this case group i obtains a payoﬀ of 1, while it obtains a payoﬀ of zero
otherwise. The probability of being recognized is equal to the group’s share of seats in the
Senate (pi), which completes the proof.
In this model, no group is assumed to hold a majority of the seats in the Senate. It
follows that the bills passed by the House that are also approved by the Senate are those in
which at least two groups receive more than their continuation values.
The next step is to analyze the game in the House following a rejection of the President’s
proposal. A representative who is selected to propose holds all the bargaining power within
the House. In eﬀect, this amender chooses between two options: either propose an allocation
9that will be also approved by the Senate, or choose a proposal that will be amended in the
Senate. The optimal choice in the former class consists of acquiring the support of the group
with the lowest continuation value in the Senate to form a coalition. The best option in
the latter class is to keep the entire amount of resources and let the Conference Committee
determine the ﬁnal bill. This leads to the following result:










Proof. Let i be the representative chosen to amend the President’s proposal. The maximum
value group i can achieve by proposing an amendment that will be approved by the Senate is
1−minj =i pj. In fact, all representatives will vote in favor of the amendment, while senators
from groups j  = i will vote in favor only if xj ≥ pj. Group i then ﬁnds it optimal to acquire
the support of the group with smallest senate delegation.
If group i proposes an amendment that will not be approved by the Senate, the bill
approved in the Senate is independent of what happens in the House. Let x denote the
proposed amendment. Therefore, group i has an expected payoﬀ of pi at the Senate stage
and of xi at the House. The outcome of the Conference committee is simply 1
2 (x + p).
Hence, the amending representative will propose a bill x which gives him the entire amount
of resources in the house, thereby obtaining a payoﬀ of 1
2 (xi = 1) + 1
2 (xi = pi).
Furthermore, it turns out that the optimal strategy is always the same, i.e. independent
of the amender’s identity:
Proposition 3 For any distribution of seats, all Representatives propose an amendment
that will be approved by the Senate.
Proof. For any p ∈ ∆2 such that pi  = pj ∀i,j , it is the case that 1−minj =i pj >
1+pi
2 . This
can be shown by letting the proposer be a member of group i and deﬁning pH := maxj =i pj
and pL := minj =i pj. The following inequalities can then be established: 1−minj =i pj−
1+pi
2 =








2 (pH − pL) > 0.
That is, following rejection of the President’s proposal, the group selected as an amender
targets the group that holds the smallest share of seats in the Senate and oﬀers its continu-
ation value. We can now characterize the reservation utility of each group in the House.
Proposition 4 Let qi denote group i’s share of seats in the House and pi its share of seats
in the Senate. Let p1 > p2 > p3. The three groups’ reservation utilities in the House are
10given by:
V1 = q1 (1 − p3)
V2 = q2 (1 − p3) + q3p2
V3 = (1 − q3)p3 + q3 (1 − p2).
Proof. Each group receives a payoﬀ of 1 − minj =i pj when selected as an amender and pi
when targeted by another group to form a coalition. Given the ordering of seats in the
Senate, groups 1 and 2 target group 3, while group 3 targets group 2. Therefore, group
1 obtains a payoﬀ of (1 − p3) with probability q1 and the reservation utilities of the other
groups follow analogously.
Naturally, the allocations passing in the House are those that provide expected utility
levels E (xi) ≥ Vi for at least two of the three groups. Given these results, and using the
composition of Congress in 1932, the set of proposals that would be approved unchanged
can be drawn as follows:
Figure 1 here
Finally, we turn to the president’s problem. Essentially, the president must choose be-
tween proposing an allocation that will either (i) pass untouched, (ii) be modiﬁed by the
House, or (iii) be modiﬁed by the Senate. Furthermore, Proposition 3 shows that the pres-
ident’s proposal will not be modiﬁed by both chambers. With this in mind, we can show
that an equilibrium exists.
Proposition 5 There exists an equilibrium of this game.
Proof. Let x denote the President’s proposal. Let the vectors
ei : = x ∈ ∆
2 : (xi = 1,xj =i = 0)
i ∈ {1,2,3},
represent the allocations assigning the entire amount of resources to region i. Denote by
s(x) the expected outcome following amendment of x by the Senate and the Conference







with probabilities given by {p1,p2,p3} respectively. Finally, denote by
h(x) the expected amendment of proposal x by the House. As described by Proposition 4,
for any bill x, h(x) is represents a lottery among the outcomes {(1 − p3,0,p3), (0,1 − p3,p3),
(0,p2,1 − p2)} with probabilities {q1,q2,q3} respectively. Let y(x) represent the (possibly
11random) outcome of the congressional bargaining game, as a function of the President’s








if x lies in a Passing region
if x is modiﬁed in the Senate
if x is modiﬁed in the House
.
The existence of an equilibrium of this game is equivalent to the existence of a solution
to the President’s constrained optimization problem: maxx E [f (y (x),t)]. The President’s
utility function is continuous, so it attains a maximum over a compact set. The idea of the
proof is to compute the maximum of the president’s utility over the three regions (Passing,
Modiﬁed by the House, Modiﬁed by the Senate) and then select the highest of the three
values. Let M-Senate (M-House) denote the set of proposals that are amended by the Senate
(by the House).
To adopt this procedure, we must only ensure that the President ultimately selects an
outcome from a closed set. Unfortunately, the Passing regions (the non-passing regions) are
closed sets if and only if congress members vote in favor of (against) the President’s proposal
when indiﬀerent. Therefore, let indiﬀerent Congress members vote in favor of x if and only
if the following holds:
sup
x∈Passing




E [f (s(x),t)],E [f (h,t)]
 
. (1)
This speciﬁcation for Congress members’ voting behavior allows us to obtain the following
equilibrium strategy proﬁle:
x
∗ (t) = arg max
x∈Passing
f (x,t).
Congress members vote in favor of x if indiﬀerent.












E [f (s(x),t)] > E [f (h,t)]
if sup
x∈M-Senate
E [f (s(x),t)] < E [f (h,t)]
.
Congress members vote against x if indiﬀerent
whenever(1) is not satisﬁed. In the former case, the President prefers to propose an allocation
that would not be modiﬁed. In this case the passing regions are closed (hence compact) so
12that f ( ,t) attains a maximum there. In the latter case, the President prefers to propose
an allocation that would be modiﬁed, either in the House or in the Senate. In this case,
the non-passing regions are closed. In both cases, continuity of the utility function and the
assumption (1) - or its contrary - ensure that the President has no proﬁtable deviations.
This completes the proof.
Up to this point, we have only assumed continuity of the utility function f (x,t). By
introducing the additional assumption of strict concavity of f (x,t) in x for all t, we can
establish a uniqueness result.11
Proposition 6 If the President’s utility function is strictly concave, the equilibrium outcome
of this game is also unique.
Proof. Under strict concavity, x∗ (t) is unique both in the Passing and the M-Senate regions.
The equilibrium outcome (and not strategy proﬁle) is therefore unique. The only source of
ambiguity comes from the fact that if the President wishes to have the House modify his
proposal, then he is indiﬀerent among all proposals x ∈M-House.
Note that in our model, the strict concavity of f ( ,t) implies that the President is risk-
and inequality- averse. We will make this assumption in the empirical section, and further
discuss its implications there.
As a ﬁnal comment on our formal model, we would like to stress that we view our
approach to be in line with the view of scholar such as David Mayhew and Keith Krehbiel,
who downplay the role of parties in US politics.12 Our empirical analysis does use a strong
correlation between regions and parties, but the model is not one in which outcomes are
necessarily driven by party politics. We strongly believe that this is the appropriate approach
for the context of interest in this paper. We do not, however, try to make the claim that
parties never matter.13
3 States, Regions and Goals
During the period of consideration, the US was divided in several ways that correlated
with broad geographic regions. After careful consideration of the data, we believe that an
appropriate simpliﬁcation is to divide the country into a smaller number of regions. More
11Since the outcome of the bargaining in Congress is potentially random, strict quasi concavity of f (x,t)
would not guarantee uniqueness of the President’s optimal strategy. In fact, the property of quasi concavity
does not extend to lotteries. The stronger property of (strict) concavity, however, extends to lotteries.
12At least this is our reading of works such as Mayhew (1993) and Krehbiel (1998).
13For a criticism of the views of Krehbiel and Mayhew, and for a theory of party-based politics in the US,
see Cox and McCubbins (2005).
13speciﬁcally, we believe that the optimal trade-oﬀ between simplicity and transparency on one
hand, and realism on the other, is model with focus on three regions: the South, the North
and the West. These regions diﬀered signiﬁcantly, both economically and politically, but the
states were quite homogenous within each region. The maps in ﬁgures 2(a) and 2(b) display
the assignment of states to regions, as well as the correlation between our classiﬁcation and
the political division of the country at that time.
In order to distinguish the diﬀerent possible motivations behind the New Deal, or more
speciﬁcally spending allocation, we model the objective function of the Roosevelt admin-
istration as a combination of concerns for (i) relief and recovery, (ii) fundamental reform
and development, (iii) political productivity/reelection probability, and (iv) rewarding De-
mocrats. In line with most previous work we label (i) and (ii) as “economic” and (iii) and
(iv) as “political.” These four possible concerns cover the diﬀerent objectives that people
in the aforementioned literatures on the New Deal have ascribed to the allocation of funds.
With respect to the theoretical model, these diﬀerent objectives enter the model through
the vector t in the President’s utility function. We now proceed to ﬁrst describe the three
regions, then to explain how the characteristics of each region map into Roosevelt’s utility
function.
The ﬁrst of the regions, the South, was the poorest region in the country during the
period of the New Deal. This is best seen by looking at the level of economic activity, as
reﬂected in retail sales (Figure 3(a)). Furthermore, the South was the least developed region
of the country according to more general criteria, such as the illiteracy rate (Figure 3(b)).
Hence, if fundamental reform and long-run development were the only considerations that
went into the shaping of the New Deal, this region would have been the primary target of
New Deal means.
In addition to being poor, all of the states in this region were Democratic and had
voted largely in support of Roosevelt in the 1932 election. Furthermore, their support had
been solid over the previous decades. Hence, one would expect that a partisan executive
branch, with the objective of rewarding states in which it had received support, would have
yet another reason (in addition to their economic/reform needs) to target the states in the
South. However, these states were also so solid in their support for the Democratic party
that any reelection motive behind the allocation of New Deal funds would have had to be
to their disadvantage. Finally, given the lower level of manufacturing development, their
actual drop in economic performance during the Great Depression was not as marked as the
drop of the other regions. Hence, if the primary motive behind the New Deal was to provide
short-term relief and/or recovery, this should also have shown up as a spending disadvantage
for the Southern states.
14The second of the regions, the West, was also a largely Democratic region during the
period of the New Deal implementation. Roosevelt won 58% of the popular vote in the
West, and only four states had a signiﬁcant republican representation in their congressional
delegation. On the other hand, the states in the West were not nearly as solidly grounded
in the Democratic camp as the states in the South. In fact, over the previous decades,
support for the Democratic party in western states had been more volatile than anywhere
else (Figure 3(d)). Hence, if the Roosevelt administration had political motives in mind when
implementing the New Deal programs, one would expect the President to include the Western
states both in attempts to reward its own base (and the Congress members from its party)
and in attempts to secure electoral votes for coming elections. However, the states in the
West were signiﬁcantly richer and more developed than the states in the South, which implies
that a New Deal that was primarily motivated by fundamental economic reform would not
have paid particular attention to these states. Finally, we emphasize that whether programs
aiming at immediate relief and recovery would have been to the advantage of the West or not
depends on what kind of program we are focusing on. Though the West was not hit as hard
as the Northeast in terms of manufacturing output, it did suﬀer a severe drop in agricultural
output. This is illustrated in Figure 3(e), which shows the percentage of failing farmland
in the diﬀerent regions. Hence, spending on farming programs, would have provided relief
and recovery in this region of the country. Furthermore, the West was in many ways a
suitable target for public works programs, due to its low level of existing infrastructure and
its availability of natural resources. (However, as described later, in the baseline estimations
we are agnostic about the suitability of public works programs.) On the other hand, more
general relief programs, targeted at parts of the country in which the manufacturing sector
was hard-hit, were unlikely to have the states in the West as targets for provision of relief
and recovery, given the lower level of manufacturing development compared to the Northern
part of the country.
As ﬁgures 3(a) and 3(b) show, the third of the regions, the North, was also signiﬁcantly
richer and more developed than the South. Hence, in terms of need for fundamental reform
and long-run development, one would not expect the New Deal programs to target the
North. In addition, the North was largely Republican, so partisan concerns (i.e. a focus on
Democratic states) would have added to the disadvantage of these states, in the sense of not
being recognized and targeted for spending by the Presidential administration.
The Northern states did, however, have two characteristics that should have worked
to their favor in the determination of the spending allocation. First of all, they were not
solidly Republican; FDR narrowly lost many of these states and in addition their support
for the Democratic presidential contender in the recent history had been very low. Hence a
15reelection-motivated FDR would have had incentives to target these states with the objective
of building popularity for coming elections. In addition, the industrial North was particularly
hard-hit by the drop in the manufacturing sector. This is reﬂected, for instance, in some early
statistics, such as the 1930 unemployment rate (Figure 3(f)). Hence, if relief / recovery was
the primary motivation behind the New Deal, we would expect to see programs providing
general relief to have been targeted at the Northern states.
To summarize the previous description, we characterize the regions in Table 1.
Table 1 here
Note that the West (the North) is classiﬁed as being Hard-hit only as far as the agri-
cultural (industrial) sector is concerned. Based on the characteristics above, we can assign
goals to regions. In doing this, we allow money spent in a region to serve one or more of the
administration’s goals/motives. More importantly, we let the assignment of relief/recovery
concerns to a given region depend on the type of program being considered. The assignment
of goals to regions is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2 here
Here, we are agnostic about whether public works projects were used to provide re-
lief/recovery, in addition to fundamental reform and long-run development, in the South.
That is, we do include relief/recovery concerns for the South, in addition to the North and
the West (who both experienced signiﬁcant drops in diﬀerent sectors).
4 Description of the Data
The empirical part of this study uses data collected by Fishback, Kantor and Wallis (2003)
on the distribution of spending for the New Deal programs implemented immediately after
Roosevelt’s inauguration in 1933, during the so called “100 Days.” In some extensions, we
also use data from all the years 1933 to 1937.14 Their original data, taken from the US Oﬃce
of Government Reports (1940), is used for a more detailed (county-level) empirical study.
We have aggregated their values, ﬁrst to the state then to the regional level. The regional
aggregation is done according to the assignment of states to regions shown in Figure 2(a).
14An alternative approach would be to include all of the New Deal programs directly in the baseline
model. However, as the political and economic situations changed over time, we do not believe it would be
appropriate to use a single model to describe all of the diﬀerent subperiods simultaneously. Hence, we limit
the main empirical work to the ﬁrst “100 days,” which is the part of the New Deal for which our model
should have the greatest explanatory power.
16In terms of direct/explicit relief, the two centerpieces of the Roosevelt administration’s re-
construction eﬀorts were the Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA) and the Works Progress
Administration (WPA). FERA passed in 1933 and was enacted to provide immediate grants
to states for relief projects. WPA passed two years later, in 1935 (under the Emergency
Relief Appropriation Act), with the purpose of providing public employment for people who
were out of work. Given our focus on the “100 Days”, we always include FERA (1933) in
our estimations, whereas we only use WPA in some robustness checks.
In addition to FERA and WPA, in most but not all of our estimations we include in
the general relief category loans from the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), set up
in 1933 under the Home Owners Reﬁnancing Act with the stated objective of lending to
homeowners who were facing signiﬁcant risk of defaulting on their mortgage, and insured
loans given by the Federal Housing Administration (INS/FHA).15
Besides direct relief programs, the government used public works projects to provide
relief through employment as well as through stimulation to the economy. Most importantly,
the Public Works Administration (PWA) was set up in 1933, under the National Industrial
Recovery Act. The PWA funded such diverse projects as airports, schools, hospital, warships,
dams and bridges. Following Fishback, Kantor and Wallis, we distinguish these from general
relief programs and classify them in separate category of “public works.”16
In addition to general relief and public works programs, we consider the farm programs
enacted during the New Deal period as a separate category. These programs are suﬃciently
distinct from all the others to justify a separation. In this category, the two largest programs
were the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and the Farm Credit Act (FCA), both passed
in 1933. The former was enacted with the stated objective of providing immediate relief
to farmers and paying subsidies to farmers for curtailing production of certain crops. The
latter was intended to provide operating loans to farmers on a short-term credit basis. In
addition to these two programs, a number of agencies with smaller funds, such as the Farm
Security Administration and the Rural Electriﬁcation Administration, were established. As
these were too small to change the estimation results, they are also omitted here.
The distributions of funds over the three regions, for the nine diﬀerent programs described
above, are reported in Table 3.
Table 3 here
15In addition to these programs/agencies, the Civil Works Administration (CWA) falls in the category of
"general relief." The distribution of funds of this administration were, however, small in comparison with
the other programs. We did try to include CWA funds. As it had no no eﬀect on the estimation results we
have chosen not to include it here.
16Note that the activities of the PWA were divided into two diﬀerent kinds of programs: federal programs
and state-programs (and loans). The latter were matched with federal money but on the initiative of local
authorities. We do not, however, separate these two programs in our empirical work.
175 Empirical Approach
We now turn to the empirical task of estimating President Roosevelt’s preferences based on
the predictions of our political model and on the available data. Note, ﬁrst of all, that the
limited number of data points does not allow us to use the techniques from standard econo-
metrics to obtain standard errors and perform hypotheses testing. (The baseline estimation
speciﬁcation has only seven observations.) That is, asymptotic theory and large number
approximations is not appropriate. Instead, our approach can be viewed as a nonlinear least
squares / minimum distance procedure that provides an intuitive characterization of the
motives behind the spending allocations.
5.1 Roosevelt’s Preferences
For the purposes of our empirical exercise, a more explicit form for the President’s utility
function (than the general form used in the theory section) has to be speciﬁed. Speciﬁcally,







That is, we assume Roosevelt’s preferences can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility
function with weight ti on each region. The main implication of using this particular func-
tional form is that Roosevelt is assumed to be averse to extremely unequal allocations. This
reﬂects the diﬀerence in criteria under which the President and Congress are elected, and
the consequently diﬀerent mandates they are given. It is unlikely that the President could
have justiﬁed shutting down a large region of the country from receiving any federal aid. In
addition, in 1933 FDR presented himself as a paternal, nationally uniting ﬁgure in a time
of crisis. In this context, we believe it makes sense to assume that he would have wanted to
target every region with at least some federal funds.
In order to relate the President’s taste parameters for each region to the various objec-
tives he could pursue through the allocation of the funds, let α, γ, δ and φ represent the
weights that he assigns to the goals of political productivity, rewarding, relief/recovery and
reform, respectively. The President’s preferences are then deﬁned over the shares assigned to
each group, weighted by population size and the parameters pertaining to the each group’s
characteristics. More speciﬁcally, the weights in the President’s utility function are given by




I(i∈Productive)α + I(i∈Democrat)γ + I(i∈HardHit)δ + I(i∈Poor)φ
 
.
18Therefore, the assignment of diﬀerent weights to each of the regions reﬂects the previous
classiﬁcation. Note that diﬀerent regions are considered hard hit depending on the type of
programs targeting them. These additional assumptions on the President’s utility function
allow us to obtain two further results in characterizing the equilibrium of the political model.








Proof. Straightforward from the utility maximization problem on the simplex.
Note that if the President’s preference parameters ci were identical for all regions, he
would equalize per capita spending. In addition, if the allocation x∗ lies in a Passing region
of the simplex, it also constitutes the unique prediction of our model.
Corollary 8 The President always proposes an allocation that is approved by the House.
Proof. Any allocation resulting from the amendment process in the House assigns no re-
sources to one of the regions. Under Cobb-Douglas utility, these allocations achieve the lower
bound on the President’s utility.
In Appendix A, we present some examples that show how the President’s preferences
over economic and political goals map into proposed allocations. In the following sections,
we use these results together with the historical evidence to devise the following empirical
procedure.
5.2 Estimation Strategy
The main goal of the empirical approach is to identify the parameter values of the Pres-
ident’s objective function that provide the best ﬁt of the model’s predicted allocations to
the observed data. We deﬁne theoretical allocations as our model’s predicted allocations, a
function of the President’s preferences and the outcome of the President-Congress bargaining
game. Note that under the Cobb-Douglas utility function assumption, the equilibria of our
model can lead to three very diﬀerent types of outcomes: (i) the immediate approval of bills
that implement FDR’s ideal allocation, (ii) the immediate approval of bills that implement
a Congress-constrained allocation diﬀerent from FDR’s ideal allocation, (iii) the approval
of bills that pass untouched through the House but are radically amended in the Senate.
Discerning between the three types of outcomes in the data is a key step.
19In the actual empirical work, we start by plotting the allocations in the simplex repre-
senting the outcomes of the bargaining game. This is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4 here
We observe that only one of these observations lies in a “passing region” (which would
lead to type (i) outcomes), and then exploit the historical fact that during the “100 Days”
Congress did not amend FDR’s proposals substantially.17 This rules out type (iii) outcomes.
Combining these two facts, we conclude that each observed allocation must correspond to
a type (ii) outcome. In other words, we conjecture that Roosevelt was aware that his ideal
allocations were politically infeasible and that his proposals took congressional constraints
into account. Therefore, the observations must be generated from allocations approved by
Congress that lie along one or more constraints. We attribute any diﬀerences between the
observed allocations and the (theoretical) congressional constraints to “execution error” by
the federal agencies through which the funds were distributed.18
Identifying the relevant binding constraints is the hardest task in this approach. To this
end, note the division of programs into General Relief, Public Works and Farming. For each
program type, we select the constraint closest to the observed allocations and conjecture
it was the binding congressional constraint. We then construct the theoretical allocation
for each group of programs separately, as the equilibrium of the model under the type’s
conjectured congressional constraint.
Having determined (conjectured) which constraints that were the binding ones, we pro-
ceed to the actual derivation of the model’s parameters. This is done with a minimum
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s.t. (α,γ,δ,φ) ≥ (0,0,0,0)
s.t. α + γ + δ + φ = 1
17For instance, according to Patterson (1967, page 3): “the passage of eleven key bills in 1933 took only a
total of forty hours of debate in the House. The legislative process in the Senate was a bit more careful but
still not slow.”
18By these means we allow - and indeed we ﬁnd - these “errors” not to have a zero mean. Not surprisingly,
the observed allocations are often closer to FDR’s estimated ideal points. Note that this does not aﬀect
the Congressional bargaining game described above. It simply means that FDR, or agencies with similar
objectives as FDR, probably had some ex-post inﬂuence over the spending.
20where w is a K−dimensional vector of weights containing the total size of each of the
programs considered and xTHEORY is the vector corresponding to Roosevelt’s ideal point
under the intuitive conjecture that the Western senators constrained the allocation of General
Relief programs and that the Southern representatives constrained all other programs.
Finally, once we have obtained a vector of parameter estimates, we perform a number
of simple checks (though not hypothesis tests in the traditional econometric sense) of the
internal consistency of the results and the tightness of the parameter estimates. First and
foremost, after estimating the preference parameters, we make an attempt to falsify the
conjecture about slack vs. binding constraints, using the estimation results. Given the
estimated parameter values, we can easily compute FDR’s ideal allocations. Then, under
the conjecture of Congress-constrained allocations, if any of FDR’s ideal allocations lie in
the passing regions, our conjectured equilibrium is falsiﬁed by the data.
Obviously, for each conjectured combination of binding vs slack constraints, we can at
most use this test to conclude that the data does not falsify the model. Clearly, this does
not mean that the test will necessarily reject a false model. Nevertheless, we try a number
of alternative assumptions about which constraints (if any) were actually binding, and seek
to obtain non-falsiﬁable conjectures. To preview the results: the above described baseline
conjecture (regarding which constraints that bind) turns out to be the only conjecture passing
the consistency test.
5.3 Baseline Estimation Results
The baseline estimation considers the levels of the allocation of funds in the seven New
Deal programs passed during the “100 Days”. In the criterion function, each program is
weighted by its total size. As a theoretical allocation, we consider a scenario in which FDR’s
distribution of general relief funds is constrained by the West in the Senate whereas the
allocations of farming and public works funds are both constrained by the South in the
House. The parameter estimates delivered by this procedure are reported in Table 4.
Table 4 here
These estimates allow us to compute FDR’s ideal allocations. The ideal allocations can
be viewed as a counterfactual experiment, in which the following question is asked: How
diﬀerent would the distribution of funds have looked if the executive branch (FDR) had
been unconstrained in the implementation of new government programs? Note, for instance,
the implication that FDR would have liked to give a greater share of the general relief
programs to the North, had he not been constrained by the West.
21Finally, in order to perform a falsiﬁcation test, we derive the predictions that follow from
our estimated parameters, but with Roosevelt constrained. The ideal allocations and the
predictions of the constrained model are reported in Table 5.
Table 5 here
These allocations diﬀer from the observations by an average of 0.0582. More importantly,
the conjectured scenario in which these constraints (West in the Senate for general relief
programs, South in the House for the other programs) are binding is the only one under which
our estimated ideal allocations would not pass through Congress untouched. In other words,
our baseline conjecture is the only one in which the conjectured congressional constraints
can not be falsiﬁed jointly by the data and the parameter estimates. We take this as a check
of the internal consistency of the model.
5.4 Robustness Checks
Our baseline speciﬁcation (reprinted as BASE in Table 6) considers the levels of the seven
observed allocations separately. We now proceed to operate a series of robustness checks by
means of estimating our parameters under several diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the President-
Congress bargaining game.
5.4.1 Minor Changes to the Estimation Approach
In this part, we present the results of several minor changes to the estimation execution.
First and foremost, we estimate the model including all the nine programs (L9). We then
test for congressional logrolling. Speciﬁcally, this means that we treat all allocations from
any given type of program passed in the same year as a unique bill, which leaves us with ﬁve
observations. The result of this estimation is displayed in the row labeled L5. Finally, instead
of assigning diﬀerent weights to diﬀerent programs based on their size (in total spending), we
estimate the parameters assigning equal weights to all of the nine baseline program programs.
The results of this exercise are labeled L9uw in Table 6.
5.4.2 Program-Speciﬁc Bargaining Powers
In the next three robustness checks (R9, R5, R9UW), we give a diﬀerent interpretation to our
structural error. Here, we acknowledge that our model’s constraints can only represent with
approximation the bargaining powers in place in Congress during the New Deal. Moreover,
by requiring the President to obtain the support of two large congressional players, we are
22de facto ruling out the possibility of building smaller majority coalitions. In reality, by
targeting only part of the states in a given region, FDR could potentially tend less to that
region’s interest and propose an allocation that is closer to his ideal point. Certainly, the
historical evidence does suggests that FDR’s proposals passed with large support. However,
it is still possible that some of the bills’ crafting and actual bargaining took place outside of
the formal sessions of the Congress, implying that the voting record in Congress do not fully
capture the shape of the real coalitions behind the bills. Hence, we believe that an alternative
speciﬁcation, with a less precise interpretation of the constraints, is a useful exercise.
More speciﬁcally, while maintaining the same conjecture regarding which constraints were
binding, we now assume that the politically constraining regions received exactly what was
necessary in each session to win their support. This is equivalent to assuming that, for each
program, the congressmen from the constraining region were able to correctly predict the
ﬁnal allocation and required exactly what they eventually received in order to vote in favor
of the program. Note that this is consistent with the idea that, for all the programs where
the observed allocations do not fall in theoretical “passing regions” (as given in Figure 1),
FDR might have passed the bills with smaller winning coalitions than those implied by the
baseline approach.
With this approach, the ratio between the shares of any two regions is independent of
the share received by the third one (a consequence of the Cobb-Douglas assumption imposed
on the President’s preferences). Together with the assumption that the observed allocations
directly deliver the binding constraint for each program, this implies that we are able to
estimate FDR’s preference parameters on the basis only of the ratios of the allocations
received by the non-constraining regions.
We carry out this estimation approach for all programs separately and also under our
logrolling speciﬁcation (R5 in Table 6). Finally, we perform the estimation placing equal
weights on all nine programs (R9UW). The resulting parameter estimates are very similar
to the case of varying weights. This works as a conﬁrmation of the relative homogeneity of
approved allocations across the three types of programs, which is already evident from the
data.
To summarize the results of diﬀerent empirical procedures, we are quite conﬁdent that our
estimates lie within the bounds reported in Table 6. These preliminary estimates indicate
that economic concerns, in particular providing relief/recovery, were the primary motives
behind the New Deal. Political motives were also existent, but less important.
236 Concluding Discussion
In this paper, we develop a formal model of bargaining in the US Congress and apply the
model to the spending decisions of 1933 during the so-called “100 Days,” in hope of improving
our understanding of the objectives behind the implementation of the New Deal. In the
theoretical model, the distribution of government funds over regions of the country is the
outcome of a bargaining game, in which the President acts as the agenda-setter (proposer)
and Congress bargains over the ﬁnal shape of the spending bill. We take into account
the two-chamber structure of the Congress, and explicitly model the sequential nature of the
legislative process, with the House of Representatives acting before the Senate. Furthermore,
we assume that both the Congress members and the President are sequentially rational.
For any given set of preference parameters (in the President’s utility function) and any
given distribution of seats in the Congress, we can solve the model for a unique predicted
outcome, i.e. a unique predicted distribution of funds across regions. This allows us to
use the actual distributions of New Deal funds to estimate the preference parameters of
the Roosevelt administration. We link theory to data and estimate the model’s parameters
using a simple minimum distance approach. That is, we estimate Roosevelt’s preference
parameters by minimizing a weighted distance between the actual distributions and the
theoretical (model) expressions characterizing the equilibrium. The limited number of data
points implies the standard econometric approach (asymptotic theory) for deriving standard
errors and hypotheses tests is not appropriate. Hence, we are unable to assess the “tightness”
of our estimated parameter values. Instead, as a robustness check, we estimate a number of
diﬀerent versions of the model, controlling for possible logrolling and misspeciﬁcations of the
constraints imposed on Roosevelt by the 73rd Congress. In addition, we discuss and apply
some more “conceptual tests” - ways in which parameter estimates could be falsiﬁed due to
internal incoherences of the model. Our baseline estimation pass these falsiﬁcation tests.
The baseline parameter estimates indicate that the motivation behind the New Deal
was primarily economic, but that political concerns do seem to have existed as well. All of
the robustness checks give a similar and reasonably coherent picture. In particular, all the
speciﬁcations deliver estimates that imply a signiﬁcantly greater concern for relief/recovery
(one of the two motives labeled as “economic”) than for any other motive. Regarding the
other possible motives, political productivity (reelection concerns) appears to have been of
lesser importance. The relative relevance of concerns for fundamental reform vs. reward
for democratic states is unclear, as it varies across speciﬁcations. Neither of these motives,
however, appears to have been as important as relief/recovery. Taken together, this is broadly
in line with what we perceive to be the general message of the body of research by John
24Wallis: that economic concerns for relief and recovery, though not necessarily for fundamental
reform and development, largely drove the New Deal, and that purely “political” concerns
mattered but more on the margin.
We would like to stress that this paper should be viewed as a complement to the existing
work on the objectives of the New Deal. Our formal approach has the advantage of delivering
precise meaning to the estimated parameters. However, this comes at the obvious cost
of reducing the richness of the model’s institutional setting, in comparison with previous
research. We can only explain the part of the spending that was determined by the President
and Congress. and we do not capture preferences over the tax collection or budget deﬁcit
necessary to fund the spending programs (though this is a simpliﬁcation we share with most
previous research). In addition, the aggregation of states into regions implies we have nothing
to contribute to the analysis of the local (intra-region) distribution of funds.
While recognizing these limitations, we do believe that there is scope for further research
that could extend this paper in several ways. In particular, although we do perform a
number of robustness checks controlling for diﬀerent forms of logrolling, we do not explicitly
model how (whether) funds from one type program could be used by the President to relax
constraints for a diﬀerent program. To do that would require introducing additional dynamic
features to account for the sequential nature multiple bills, and issues of credibility would
become central. We consider this extension very interesting, as it would provide a general
model that could be used to analyze political logrolling. However, it would also introduce
signiﬁcant additional modeling complexity, and would necessarily shift the focus away from
the empirical / historical aspects of this research project. Hence, it falls outside the scope
of this paper, which is meant to be applied with focus on the New Deal period.
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28A Examples
The following numerical examples illustrate the outcomes of the President-Congress bar-
gaining game under diﬀerent assumptions on the President’s preferences. In particular, we
maintain the composition of Congress in 1932 and consider the two cases in which the Presi-
dent pursues only economic goals (reform, recovery) and political goals (productivity, reform)
respectively.
A.1 Economic Goals
Suppose the President is equally interested in reform and recovery but completely uninter-
ested in politics. In our model’s terminology, this is equivalent to assuming α = γ = 0 and
δ = φ = 1
2. As an example, consider a general relief program, such as unemployment beneﬁts.
















and it would pass since both xN and xS exceed max{VN,pN} and max{VS,pS} respectively.
















This allocation would also pass, though supported by a diﬀerent majority coalition.

















2NS + NW + NN
= .48
This allocation would pass in the House since both the West and the South would endorse
29it, and it would pass in the Senate, supported this time by the North and the South. Hence,
we can conclude that an economic President would see the ideal allocations pass, and these
ideal allocations would be given by the expressions above.
A.2 Political Goals
In this example, we suppose that the President only cares about political productivity and
rewarding Democratic states. Formally, let α = γ = 1
2 and δ = φ = 0. Then for general relief

















2NW + NN + NS
= .22
Only the North’s representatives would support this allocation, which would be therefore
rejected by the House. As a consequence, the President would choose to “buy oﬀ” the South
in the House and the North in the Senate, by proposing the following allocation:
x
∗
W = (1 − VS − pN) = .35
x
∗
N = pN = .29
x
∗
S = VS = .36
In this case, the ideal and constrained optimal allocations for public works and farming
programs would be identical. In fact, these programs only diﬀer with respect to the economic
relief component, which receives zero weight in the current formulation of the President’s
preferences.
Formally, one needs to verify that FDR prefers this allocation to other constrained allo-
cations close to his ideal point. It can be shown, for instance, that he would obtain a lower
utility were he to “buy oﬀ” only one region.





Potential swing-state ￿ ￿
Democratic in previous election ￿ ￿
Note: a = agricultural sector, i = industrial sector.
Table 1: Regional Characteristics
Administrations’ Concerns South West North
Reform/Development ￿






Note: p = public works programs, f = farming, r = general relief
Table 2: Goals and Regions
Region Shares
Program Name Program Type Year Total Funds North South West
FERA General Relief 1933 2.7 .50 .20 .30
WPA General Relief 1935 6.2 .54 .19 .28
HOLC General Relief 1933 3.1 .54 .19 .28
INS/FHA General Relief 1934 2.7 .45 .20 .35
PWA, Federal Public Works 1933 0.8 .41 .24 .35
PWA, Match 1 Public Works 1933 0.6 .41 .34 .23
PWA, Match 2 Public Works 1933 1.4 .44 .25 .32
AAA Farming 1933 2.0 .03 .43 .49
FCA Farming 1933 1.3 .12 .32 .56
Note: Total Funds are in billions of dollars (1932).
Table 3: Program Details
31Politics Economics
Productivity (α) Rewarding (γ) Recovery (δ) Reform (φ)
0.1120 0.0920 0.6029 0.1931
Table 4: Baseline Parameter Estimates
Ideal Allocations Predicted Allocations
Program Type North South West North South West
Relief 0.6739 0.2055 0.1206 0.4598 0.1402 0.4000
Farming 0.1339 0.2607 0.6054 0.1159 0.3600 0.5241
Pub.Works 0.3762 0.3574 0.2663 0.3747 0.3600 0.2653
Table 5: Ideal and Predicted Allocations
Percentage Weight Estimates
Goals Base L9 L5 L9uw Base L9 R5 R9uw min max
Productivity 11.20 11.07 15.39 10.68 9.24 9.76 12.63 9.64 9.24 15.39
Rewarding 9.20 9.18 8.68 9.27 9.60 11.57 12.35 10.02 8.68 12.35
Recovery 60.29 60.51 55.90 59.93 54.45 57.28 57.35 56.85 54.45 60.51
Reform 19.31 19.24 20.03 20.12 22.49 21.39 17.67 23.49 17.67 23.49
Total 7 9 9 9 7 9 9 9
Criterion L L L L R R R R
Weights YES YES YES NO YES YES YES NO
Note: L=Levels of allocations ; R=Program-Speciﬁc Bargaining Powers
Table 6: Estimation Results
32Figure 1: Bargaining Outcomes and Congressional Constraints
33(a) Regional Classiﬁcation
(b) Political Support for FDR
Figure 2: Maps






























































Figure 3: Regional Characteristics
35Figure 4: Observed Allocations
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